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ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE REGULATION AND SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS: THE SUPREME COURT
OF FLORIDA LEGISLATES
CAROLINE N. BRUCKEL*
Plaintiff corporation' filed its complaint in the Leon County Cir-
cuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, attacking the
constitutionality 2 of Florida Statutes section 562.21 (1973) 3 on four-
teenth amendment equal protection and substantive due process
grounds. The trial court granted defendants' 4 motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.5 On direct
appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, held, reversed and remanded:
Section 562.21, which subjects retail vendors of beer and wine to "cash
only" purchases from distributors, in contrast to vendors of liquor,
who are allowed to buy from distributors on ten days' credit, violates
fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection requirements.
Castlewood International Corp. v. Wynne, 294 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1974)
(Castlewood I).
On remand from the supreme court, the trial court was confused
by the apparent applicability of Florida Statutes section 561.42
(1973),6 Florida's general "Tied House Evil" law, which prohibits the
*Senior Articles & Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. Plaintiff is a Florida corporation doing business as "Big Daddy's Liquors and Lounges,"
selling wine, beer and liquor for consumption both on and off the premises.
2. [N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The statute is also alleged in the complaint to be violative of the Florida Constitution. The
applicable provisions, however, are not specified, and this issue is never addressed by any court.
3. Sale of beer and wine to vendors for cash only.-All sales of malt, brewed or vinous
beverages as defined in the beverage law, made by manufacturers, when distributing
under a manufacturer's license, wholesalers and distributors to retail licensees must be
for cash only, and cash in this instance means that delivery and payment therefor is to
be a simultaneous transaction and and any maneuver, device or shift of any kind
whereby credit is extended shall constitute a violation of the beverage law.
FLA. STAT. § 562.21 (1973).
4. Primary defendant was Winston Wynne, Director of Division of Beverage of the Depart-
ment of Business Regulation; the other defendants were the Division of Beverage and the
Department of Business Regulation. The Beer Industry of Florida, Inc. was permitted to
intervene as a defendant.
5. Castlewood Int'l Corp. v. Wynne, No. 73412 (Leon Co. Cir. Ct., May 3, 1973). The trial
judge found plaintiff's allegation of the statute's unconstitutionality to be without merit in light of
several recent decisions in various jurisdictions approving similar "Tied House Evil" statutes,
which are designed to prohibit any control by alcoholic beverage distributors and wholesalers
over retail vendors. See, e.g., Mayhue's Super Liquor Store, Inc. v. Meiklejohn, 426 F.2d 142
(5th Cir. 1970).
6. Tied house evil; financial aid and assitance to vendor by manufacturer or distributor
prohibited; . . . exceptions.-
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sale on credit by a distributor or wholesaler to a retailer of any
alcoholic beverage except liquor. Although section 561.42 had been
before the supreme court in Castlewood I, it had not been ruled
unconstitutional, either wholly or in part. Since the trial court consi-
dered it possible that the operation of section 561.42 might still require
the denial of credit to beer and wine vendors, notwithstanding the
unconstitutionality of section 562.21, it scheduled a hearing on the
mandate, requesting the parties to submit memoranda on the extent of
credit allowable to retail vendors of any alcoholic beverages. 7 The
outcome of the circuit court's deliberation was a final judgment and
order on the mandate in which retail vendors of beer and wine re-
mained, as before, subject to the restriction of "cash only" sales.8
(1) no licensed manufacturer, or distributor, of any of the beverages herein referred
to shall have any financial interest, direcly or indirectly, in the establishment or
business of any vendor licensed under the beverage law, nor shall such licensed
manufacturer or distributor assist any vendor. by any gifts or loans of money or
property of any description or any rebates from any such licensed manufacturer or
distributor; provided, however, that this shall not apply . . . to the extension of
credit, for liquors sold, made strictly in compliance with the provisions of this
section.
(2) Credit for the sale of liquors may be extended to any vendor up to but not
including the tenth day qfter the calendar week within which such sale was made.
(7) The extension or receiving of credits in violation of this section shall be
considered as an arrangement for financial assistance and shall constitute a viola-
tion of the beverage act and any maneuver, shift or device of any kind by which
credit is extended contrary to the provisions of this section shall be considered a
violation of the beverage act.
(8) The division may establish rules and require reports to enforce the herein
established limitation upon credits and other forms of assistance. Nothing herein
shall be taken to affect the provisions for cash sales of wines or beer as are provided
in § 562.21 or provisions of § 563.08 but shall govern all other sales of intoxicating
liquors.
FLA. STAT. § 561.42 (1973) (emphasis added).
7. As indicated in its memorandum decision, five alternatives were suggested to the court at
the hearing on the mandate and in the various parties' memoranda following the hearing:
First, that Section 562.21 being void, there is no limitation on the financial or credit
arrangements for the purchase of beer and wine by vendors; and that, therefore, a
vendor is free to purchase on whatever terms or conditions may be open to him as a
matter of fact. (It is this position opted for by plaintiff and is predicated upon considera-
tions of substantive due process.)
Second, that though 562.21 be void, Section 561.42(1) and (7) remain valid (not
having been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court Opinion) and these two
section s require cash for sale of alcoholic beverages to vendors except, however, a ten
day credit be allowed to vendors of liquor as provided by Section 561.42(2) and thus,
plaintiff as a vendor of beer and wine must still pay cash for purchases. (This is the
possibility opted for by The Division of Beverage.)
Third, that the requirement of cash sale being violative of due process and as beer
and wine should not be treated differently from liquor that therefore, vendors of liquor
are entitled to equal protection and that the effect of the opinion therefore results in
561.42(1), (2) and (7) being unconstitutional and thus there can be no limitation upon
credit and financing arrangements of liquor vendors as well.
Fourth, it is suggested that 562.21 was declared unconstitutional on the basis of
equal protection and that beer and wine must not be treated differently from liquor and
as the Supreme Court did not find fault with the granting of ten days credit to liquor,
that equal protection requires that beer and wine be declared subject to the same credit
terms as set forth in Section 561.42(2).
Finally, if there can be no discrimination between beer and wine vis h vis liquor,
then the effect of the opinion is to declare Section 561.42(2) unconstitutional and thus all
sales to vendors of beer, wine and whiskey must be for cash.
Castlewood Int'l Corp. v. Wynne, No. 73-412, at 2-3 (Leon Co. Cir. Ct., July 29, 1974).
8. Castlewood Int'l Corp. v. Wynne, No. 73-412 (Leon Co. Cir. Ct., July 29, 1974).
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Plaintiff responded by filing in the supreme court a "Petition for
Constitutional Writ in Aid of Jurisdiction and/or Petition for Entry of
a Decree in Accordance with Previous Mandate." 9 Virtually ignoring
the defendants' objection that the court would have no jurisdiction
under the writ, the supreme court granted plaintiff's petition and held,
reversed and remanded: Retail vendors of beer and wine are entitled to
the same credit period of ten days which is granted to retail vendors of
liquor by section 561.42(2) since the statutory term "intoxicating
liquor" includes not only distilled liquor, but also beer and wine.
Castlewood International Corp. v. Wynne, 305 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1974)
(Castlewood II).' 0
Section 562.21 is integrally related to section 561.42.1 Both are
part of the general scheme of "Tied House Evil" laws common to most
states.12 Such laws are generally recognized13 as having been enacted
to prohibit manufacturers, wholesalers and distributors of
alcoholic beverages from controlling retail outlets operated by
licensed vendors through granting, withholding or extension
of credit, the lending of money, investment in the business of
the retailer, the making of rebates or the giving of any other
financial assistance. The purpose of the act is to protect not
only the public interest but also the interest of retail vendors
licensed under the provisions of the act.
14
In ascribing this laudable purpose to the legislatures, the courts have
been almost unanimous in upholding the "Tied House Evil" laws,
finding them in compliance with fourteenth amendment substantive
due process, procedural due process and equal protection require-
ments. 15
In the area of credit restrictions, the courts until Castlewood I
were apparently in full agreement as to the validity of the statutes. 16
In Mayhue's Super Liquor Store, Inc. v. Meiklejohn, 17 issues substan-
9. See FLA. APP. R. 4.5(g) (1).
10. The two supreme court decisions together shall be cited as Castlewood.
11. See Mayhue's Super Liquor Store, Inc. v. Meiklejohn, 426 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1970).
12. Id.
13. Pickerill v. Schott, 55 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 815 (1952); accord,
Weisberg v. Taylor, 409 Ill. 384, 100 N.E.2d 748 (1951); Tom & Jerry, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor
Control Comm'n, 183 Neb. 410, 160 N.W.2d 232 (1968); Neel v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 259
S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); see, e.g., Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 396 (1968); cf. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
14. Musleh v. Fulton Distrib. Co., 254 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
15. But cf. Block v. Thompson, 472 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1973) (denial of transfer of location);
Parks v. Allen, 409 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1969) (denial of license); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605
(5th Cir. 1964); Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1947)
(revocation of license). It is clear at a glance that most of these cases deal with the licensing of
alcoholic beverage vendors. Statutes vague on their faces or unsystematically and arbitrarily
enforced in the granting and denial of such privileges are peculiarly vulnerable to attack on
traditional grounds of procedural due process and equal protection. The paucity of such cases,
however, suggests the scope of the courts' reluctance to gainsay the legislature in the field of
alcoholic beverage legislation.
16. See Annot., 17 A.L.R3d 396 (1968).
17. 426 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1970).
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tially identical to those in Castlewood I were decided adversely to a
plaintiff who attacked the Florida "Tied House Evil" laws, including
the denial of credit to beer and wine' vendors, on fourteenth amend-
ment grounds. The question of statutory validity under the federal
constitution was found to be of such little merit by the Fifth Circuit
that it was constrained to hold the federal question too insubstantial to
be decided on the merits. Not only the Fifth Circuit's own evaluation,
but also the implications of the prior dismissal of the same case by the
United States Supreme Court for want of jurisdiction 18 compelled this
result. 19 In holding section 562.21 unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court of Florida thus set itself in opposition not only to the expressed
will of the Florida legislature, but also to the pronouncements of every
court which had previously ruled upon the issue.
The theoretical basis for the holdings in the Castlewood cases is
subject to an abundance of inferential difficulties since the court in
Castlewood I seems to confuse substantive due process and equal
protection. For this reason, a consideration of the case law underlying
the decision in Castlewood I is helpful in drawing conclusions about
the possible grounds for the supreme court's holding.
In Pickerill v. Schott, 20 which upholds the constitutionality of
section 561.42, the Supreme Court of Florida cites the Illinois case of
Weisberg v. Taylor 2I as "[o]ne of the best reasoned opinions on [the]
question" 22 of credit restrictions in sales of alcoholic beverages by
distributors to retail vendors. Since Weisberg is on point with
Castlewood I and upholds the constitutionality of "cash only" sales to
beer vendors while allowing other retail vendors a credit period, the
court's disposition of the equal protection and substantive due process
issues is illuminating.
The court in Weisberg rejects the equal protection argument,
finding a rational basis for the classification since "[h]istorically, the
18. Mayhue's Super Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Meiklejohn, 394 U.S. 319 (1969).
19. The Fifth Circuit found itself without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case on
the authority ofEx parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30(1933). UnderPoresky, when a three-judge district
court finds a substantial federal question, jurisdiction to hear the appeal on the merits is vested
solely in the United States Supreme Court. In Mayhue the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
for want of jurisdiction. Where the federal question if found by the district court to be insubstan-
tial,
either because it is "obviously without merit" or because its unsoundness so clearly
results from the previous decisions of [the Supreme Court] as to foreclose the subject and
leave no room for the inference that the question sought to be raised can be the subject
of controversy,
Id. at 32, the circuit court of appeals is restricted to a finding as to the "substantiality" of the
attack.
In Mayhue, the court found the attack to be insubstantial within the rule of Poresky,
recognizing "[Tihat was the reading the Supreme Court must have given it." 426 F.2d at 145.
The Castlewood I decision is all the more unexpected in the face of the findings in the Mayhue
cases.
20. 55 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1951).
21. 409 Ill. 384, 100 N.E.2d 748 (1951).
22. 55 So. 2d at 719.
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problem of the 'tied house' was coupled more with the breweries than
the distilleries .... "23 The bases set forth for distinguishing between
breweries and distilleries include the larger volume of any single brand
of beer sold to any particular retailer and the localized nature of beer
production, giving breweries greater incentive to attempt to gain con-
trol over retailers. The substantive due process argument is likewise
rejected by the Weisberg court because it finds a reasonable basis for
the legislation to be inherently obvious:
The mere statement of the proposition that the extension of
credit by a creditor to a debtor does impose on the debtor an
interest, supervision, power and influence on the part of the
creditor proves itself.24
Notwithstanding the Florida court's previous praise in Pickerill
for the Weisberg decision, Castlewood I completely ignores Weisberg in
discussing the validity of the "cash only" statute, section 562.21.
Moreover, some of the cases which Castlewood I does cite as authority
are of dubious value.
The Fifth Circuit case of Mayhue v. City of Plantation25 is relied
upon to establish the constitutional requirement that a "statutory dis-
crimination must be based on differences that are reasonably related to
the purposes of the Act."'26 However, the impact of such a requirement
is surely modified by the decision of the same court in Mayhue's Super
Liquor Store, Inc. v. Meiklejohn,27 which fails to impose such a
standard in circumstances identical to those of Castlewood I.
The citation to Hornsby v. Allen 28 in Castlewood I as authority
for the principle of the "impermissibility of inequity in conditioning
government benefits (even privileges) '29 also presents serious prob-
lems. Not only does Hornsby turn on a licensing problem, which is
different in its essence from the issue of credit denial in Castlewood 1,30
but it imposes a rule which is no longer controlling as to the effect of
the twenty-first amendment on state alcoholic beverage legislation.
The rationale adopted by the Hornsby Court is predicated upon its
assertion that "the Twenty-First Amendment did not clothe the state's
right to control the sale of liquor with any higher degree than it had
over the sale of other commodities within the state. '31 However, in the
subsequently decided case of Parks v. Allen 3 2 this statement is effec-
23. 409 Ill. at 390, 100 N.E.2d at 751.
24. 409 Ill. at 387, 100 N.E.2d at 750.
25. 375 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1967) (ruling invalid municipal ordinance discriminating against
some Sunday sales).
26. 294 So. 2d at 324.
27. 426 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1970).
28. 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
29. 294 So. 2d at 324.
30. See note 15 supra.
31. 326 F.2d at 609, citing Brown v. Jatros, 55 F. Supp. 542, 544 (E.D. Mich. 1944).
32. 409 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1969).
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tively nullified by the statement of the same court that "[t]he Twenty-
First Amendment confers upon the states broad regulatory power over
the liquor traffic within their territories. ' 33 Cases decided after Parks
have adhered to the rule of that case.3 4 Moreover, even in cases in
which Hornsby-type rationale was applied, courts required an excep-
tionally complete record regarding the operation and effect of an
alcoholic beverage control statute before rendering any finding of
-unconstitutionality under the fourteenth amendment. 35
The language of the holding in Castlewood I indicates that the
decision turns primarily on traditional equal protection analysis. The
court finds "a patent invidious discrimination to . . . retail vendors of
beer and wine," 36 both vertically within the industry and horizontally
in relation to other kinds of merchants. However, the court's observa-
tions that "restrictions must be rationally related to the purpose in
issue '3 7 and that "[s]ingling out one vendor of an intoxicating bever-
age, as opposed to another, does not constitutionally serve or satisfy
this purpose" 38 are more difficult to categorize as being based on one
clause or another of the Fourteenth amendment. The court's holding
indicates that the classification itself, and not the denial of credit, is
unconstitutional in its failure to relate reasonably to the interest of the
legislature in the health, safety or general welfare of the public. This
constitutes a confusing merging of the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses; in effect the language represents a substantive due process
issue couched in equal protection terms. 3 9
That substantive due process plays a large part in the holding of
Castlewood I becomes even more apparent in view of the court's
adoption of certain of the assertions in the plaintiff's complaint:
In our review we cannot ignore the commanding constitu-
33. Id. at 211.
34. Accord, Block v. Thompson, 472 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1973); Fletcher v. Paige, 220 P.2d
484 (Mont. 1950); see Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1947);
df. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); 27 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 509 (1973).
35. Block v. Thompson, 472 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1973); Parks v. Allen, 409 F.2d 210 (5th Cir.
1969). Interestingly, the court in Castlewood I cites Block, yet holds section 562.21 unconstitu-
tional on the basis of an incredibly meager record.
36. 294 So. 2d at 324 (emphasis in original).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Admittedly, since Ferguson v. Scrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), the United States Supreme
Court has been reluctant to base its holdings expressly on substantive due process. This has led in
some instances to an apparent incorporation into equal protection language of the essential
doctrine of substantive due process. Accord, Tribe, Foreward: Toward a Model of Roles in the
Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1973); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); cf., e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rod-
riquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
The decisions cited, however, deal with personal rights, and the apparent trend of the
Supreme Court is to incorporate substantive due process standards into the equal protection
limitation on state legislation only where fundamental personal rights are at issue.
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tional standards40 asserted by the plaintiff, in support of its
position, as the proper criteria surrounding the validity or
invalidity of the statute in question. 41
The first "standard" cited by the court is the classic "rational basis"
test for a non-suspect classification under the equal protection clause;42
the second is an openly delineated attack on substantive due process
grounds, 43 unencumbered by any of the ambiguity of phraseology
inherent in the court's actual holding. Since the court quotes at length
the plaintiff's "standards" as the "proper criteria" for evaluating the
validity of the statute, it is a reasonable inference that substantive due
process, as well as equal protection, furnishes a basis for the holding in
Castlewood I.
It is noteworthy, moreover, that the court incorporates into its
substantive due process consideration a passage from Representative
Bill Andrews' report44 to the Florida House of Representatives. Since
the report was apparently issued in connection with a House Bill on
alcoholic beverage regulation which died in committee, 45 it is of doubt-
ful effect as reliable, or even persuasive, evidence to support a sub-
stantive due process attack. The report criticizes credit restrictions on
sales of alcoholic beverages as resulting "in enormous benefit to the
wholesale beer distributor" by providing ready cash for payment of
taxes as well as for working capital. The validity of this argument is
questionable accordir4 g to some economic theories, considering the
overall availability of credit to distributors as well to retail vendors.
The restrictions seem simply to shift the burden of obtaining credit
from distributor to retail vendor and, arguably, to shift the benefit of
supplying credit from distributors to banks. 46 At any rate, there is
40. It is apparent here that the court's opinion is grounded on more than the sole standard of
the equal protection clause.
41. 294 So. 2d at 323 (emphasis added).
42. The allegation quoted in the decision from plaintiff's "prayer," reads:
(a) There is no rational basis for the difference in treatment regarding the proscription
of credit sales to the class of retail vendors of beer and wine, as contrasted to (1) retail
vendors of hard liquor; (2) retail vendors in other industries; or (3) other commercial
entities in the liquor industry (e.g. brewery manufacturers dealing with distributors).
This baseless discrimination between classes deprives Plaintiff as a member of the class
of retail vendors of beer and wine of its right to equal protection of the laws.
Id. at 322-23.
43 (b) There is no rational basis in terms of the evils designed to be prevented by the
statute-temperance and anti-monopoly-for the prescription of cash only purchases
imposed by F.S. § 562.21, F.S.A. This lack of reasonable relationship between the
"evils" and the legislative regulation establishes a denial of substantive due process of
the laws.
Id. at 323 (emphasis added).
44. Fla. House Comm. on Business Regulation, Report on the History of Florida Alcoholic
Beverage Legislation, Reg. Sess., 1973, quoted at 294 So. 2d 323.
45. H. Bill 141, Reg. Sess., 1973.
46. That the existence or abolition of such credit restrictions probably makes no difference to
the consumer is the opinion of Henry G. Manne, Professor of Law and Director, Center for the
Study of Law and Economics, University of Miami School of Law. See generally J. Ferguson,
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little question that the legislature might reasonably believe that "cash
only" sales could contribute to the public welfare. Since even the
strictest standard of substantive due process does not require proof of
the absolute efficacy of the statute in relieving the ills addressed, vague
or unreliable allegations of its ineffectuality should not contribute to a
finding of invalidity.
The court's confusion of substantive due process and equal protec-
tion is primarily of academic interest in an analysis of the Castlewood I
decision by itself. However, since the implications of that decision
have a crucial effect on the plaintiff's rights under the still-
constitutional section 561.42, the theoretical foundation for the first
supreme court decision is obviously critical.
The ambiguity of reasoning in Castlewood I contributed sig-
nificantly to the trial court's confusion after the mandate in its attempt
to determine the proper credit provision applicable to retail vendors of
beer and wine.4 7 Since the express holding in Castlewood I is limited
to ruling section 562.21 invalid, the trial court was forced to reach its
conclusion on the mandate by considering the apparent intent of the
supreme court as revealed in the court's reasoning in Castlewood I.
Since plaintiff's prayer was for a declaration of the unconstitu-
tionality of section 562.21 and for injunctive relief to prevent the
future enforcement of "cash only" sales, it may be surmised that the
supreme court's intention in allowing plaintiff to prevail was to extend
to vendors of beer and wine the same credit period already allowed
other retail vendors in section 561.42. After the decision in Castlewood
II it is immediately apparent that this was, in fact, what the court
intended to be the result of Castlewood I, especially since the court
took the case the second time under a constitutional writ in aid of
jurisdiction4 8 expressly in order to correct the trial court's misap-
prehension.
Analysis of Interstate Difference in Retail Liquor Prices: Collusion and State Regulation (Univ. of
Rochester Graduate School of Management, Working Paper Series No. 7419, June, 1974.)
47. See note 7 supra.
48. A tangential issue in Castlewood I1 is the jurisdiction of the court under the writ.
Contrary to the insistence of counsel for defendant-intervenor, the authority of the Supreme
Court of Florida to issue writs is not confined to the issuance of writs in aid of jurisdiction already
acquired by appeal, but extends to those cases which are within its appellate jurisdiction,
although no appeal has been taken. Couse v. Canal Authority, 209 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1968),
overruling State ex rel. Watson v. Lee, 150 Fla. 496, 8 So. 2d 19 (1942), insofar as Watson holds
that authority in the supreme court to issue writs may not be invoked until jurisdiction is
acquired over the cause by means of independent appellate proceedings.
But jurisdiction remains in the supreme court after a mandate only until the expiration of the
term in which that court's judgment was entered. The court, during that interval, may recall its
mandate and re-assume jurisdiction during that term despite denial of rehearing in the interim.
Chapman v. St. Stephen's Protestant Episcopal Church, 105 Fla. 683, 136 So. 238 (1931) motion
to recall mandate granted, 105 Fla. 694, 138 So. 630, rehearing granted, 105 Fla. 717, 139 So.
188, Modified, 105 Fla. 717, 145 So. 757 (1932).
The term of the supreme court is provided in FLA. STAT. § 25.05 1 (1973): "The supreme
court shall hold 2 terms in each year, . . . commencing respectively on the first day of January
and July .... " Since the supreme court's original order in Castlewood was issued on April 17,
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Nevertheless, after Castlewood I the intent of the supreme court
was obfuscated to some degree by its apparent reliance on equal
protection as the sole ground for its holding. Despite the court's refer-
ence to substantive due process in the body of its opinion, all parties
except the plaintiff at the hearing on the mandate presented their
arguments as if the result were dependent exclusively on the equal
protection clause. Granting the trial court's understandable misap-
prehension in omitting substantive due process from its consideration,
the decision reached by the circuit judge is nonetheless puzzling in its
failure to take into account even the equal protection clause. The
action of the trial court in centering its second opinion on the remain-
ing constitutionality of section 561.4249 had the anomalous effect of
rendering the plaintiff's substantive rights unchanged despite the sup-
reme court's decision in Castlewood I.
A result entirely different from the denial of credit to beer and
wine vendors and its retention with respect to liquor vendors would
have been forthcoming in the trial court if any of the constitutional
grounds for the Castlewood I decision had been taken into account.
Assuming the trial judge had perceived equal protection as the exclu-
sive legitimate basis for the supreme court's opinion, his decision
logically should have been to disallow credit to any retail vendor of
any type of alcoholic beverage. This result would have been necessary
because, under the supreme court's decision that the statutory clas-
sification is invalid, beer and wine vendors must be subject to equal
treatment with liquor vendors as to credit restrictions. Whether the
equal treatment should be "cash only" for all or ten days credit for all
depends on which alternative would do the least violence to section
561.42. Since the overall purpose of the "Tied House Evil" law is to
prohibit financial assistance of any kind from distributor to retailer,
the general rule of section 561.42 is to prohibit, among other forms of
financial assistance, any extension of credit. 50 That the withholding of
credit was considered by the legislature to be a critical element in its
and the order of the circuit court from which petition was taken came down July 29, it is clear
that no longer was jurisdiction vested in the supreme court independent of the usual constitu-
tional jurisdiction by way of appeal.
Even under the broad rule in Couse, it is doubtful whether jurisdiction was vested by virtue
of the writ, since there were no collateral issues, the consideration or preservation of which was
dependent on the supreme court's jurisdiction over the point at issue.
Nevertheless, the supreme court's interpretation of its jurisdictional power pursuant to FLA.
CONST. art. V, § 3(b), and FLA. APP. R. 4.5(g) (1) (constitutional writs in aid of jurisdiction) is
apparently being expanded. See Dickenson v. Stone, 251 So. 2d 268, 273 (Fla. 1971) (cites
Couse); Mize v. County of Seminole, 229 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1969); Merrill v. Dade County Canvassing
Bd., 300 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). Mize seems to illustrate the usual case where the writ is used
to avoid frustrating existing exclusive jurisdiction over another issue; use of the writ unaccom-
panied by any other jurisdiction, as in Castlewood II is unusual.
The only viable theory to support the court's assertion of jurisdiction by virtue of the writ in
Castlewood is that the court accepted the writ in lieu of an appeal. This possibility, however, was
not argued by plaintiff, nor alluded to by the court.
49. See the second alternative which is stated in note 7 supra.
50. FLA. STAT. §§ 561.42(1), (7) (1973). See note 6 supra.
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regulation of alcoholic beverage distribution was perceived by the
Supreme Court of Florida itself in Pickerill v. Schott:5 1
The manufacturers, wholesalers or distributors could exercise
control by the granting or withholding of credit to retailers
just as effectively as they could by the actual lending of
money to the retailers or the investment of money in the
retailers' business. The calling of loans, the extension or the
granting of credit may be just as powerful in exercising
control as the actual ownership of a controlling interest in a
retail business, or the lending of money to establish or oper-
ate such business.
In attempting to reach a resolution of the plaintiff's rights under the
equal protection argument, it is thus important to remember that the
ten-day credit provision allowed in section 561.42(2) is an exception to
the complete prohibition against credit extension contained in sections
561.42(1) and (7). Since an equal protection attack poses a requirement
only of equality, the only sensible act would be to eliminate the
exception of ten days' credit, thereby giving full effect to the general
rule of no credit. Not only would this result do the least violence to the
general legislative intent expressed in the "Tied House Evil" law, but
it would do less damage to section 561.42, invalidating only one
subsection rather than -affecting both subsections (1) and (7).
Moreover, the legislature, if it wished, would then be free to provide a
reasonable credit period for all retail vendors of alcoholic beverage,
unhampered by any specific credit allowance granted by a court.
Had the trial court perceived its deliberations to be governed not
only by equal protection, but also by substantive due process, the
result could not have been "cash only" sales for beer and wine. Under
the equal protection clause, beer and wine vendors must be given the
same credit limitation accorded liquor vendors after Castlewood I. The
rights of liquor vendors were unaffected by the Castlewood I decision;
they remained subject to a ten-day credit limitation under section
561.42(2). The substantive operation of the due process clause, under
the plaintiff's reasoning as quoted by the supreme court, would elimi-
nate "cash only" sales for beer and wine vendors since not only the
classification itself, but the denial of credit would be unconstitutionally
unreasonable. Therefore, had the trial court used both substantive due
process and equal protection rationale, the only possible decision
would have been an allowance of ten days' credit for all retail vendors.
This result is obviously what the supreme court intended after
51. 55 So. 2d 716, 719 (Fla. 1951). The phraseology of the holding in Castlewood I avoids
any overt attack on the reasonable relationship of the denial of credit to the public welfare,
attacking instead the creation of the classification of beer and wine vendors as lacking any
reasonable relationship to the purpose in mind. Thus, ostensible harmony with PickeriUl is
preserved.
CASE COMMENT
Castlewood I; the trial court's failure to enter such an order furnished
the basis for the court's second consideration in Castlewood II. Since
the decision in this second case is meant to resolve "the trial judge's
perplexity, on remand, in deciding the resolution of the method of
payment by a vendor of beer and wine, i.e. cash on delivery, wide
open credit or ten-day credit arrangements, ' '5 2 it may reasonably be
presumed that the constitutional reasoning under the fourteenth
amendment set forth in Castlewood I also applies to the decision in
Castlewood II. Thus, if the substantive due process and equal protec-
tion clauses of the fourteenth amendment furnish the basis for the first
decision, they must also underlie the second opinion. The supreme
court says nothing in Castlewood II to negate this inference.
Nevertheless, in an attempt, perhaps, to furnish an alternative
rationale for the extension of the ten-day credit provision in section
561.42(2) to retail vendors of beer and wine, the court in Castlewood II
represents its decision as turning upon the definition of "intoxicating
liquor" as used in the Liquors and Beverage law. "Intoxicating liquor"
is currently defined in Florida Statutes section 561.01(5) (1973) in the
following manner: " 'Intoxicating beverage' and 'intoxicating liquor'
mean only those alcoholic beverages containing more than three and
two tenths per cent of alcohol by weight." After tracing the historical
development of the term "intoxicating liquor," the Castlewood II court
indicates that beer and wine are included in the term "intoxicating
liquor."'5 3 Since section 561.42(2) allows ten days' credit "for the sale of
liquors, '' 4 the supreme court concludes that, absent the constitution-
ally impermissible denial of such credit to beer and wine vendors
under section 562.21, beer and wine automatically fall within the
exception of subsection (2) and are thus entitled to a ten-day credit
allowance.
While this logic may seem reasonable at first glance, it fails to
stand up to more thorough analysis. Section 561.01(5) does not define
"liquors" as used in section 561.42(2), but defines two terms, "intox-
icating liquor" and "intoxicating beverage"; "liquor" containing more
than 3.2% alcohol is simply one of three categories of beverage in-
cluded in either of those terms. Rather, the definition of the term
"liquor" is provided in the part of the Liquors and Beverage law
devoted exclusively to the regulation of liquor vendors: "The words
'liquor' or 'distilled spirits' mean all spirituous beverages created by
distillation and by mixture of distilled beverages by what is commonly
52. 305 So. 2d at 774.
53. The court traced the history of the laws regulating the sale of alcoholic beverages from
their enactment in 1933. The high point of the court's historical development seems to be the
statutory definition of "intoxicating liquor" which was enacted in 1943: "The term 'intoxicating
beverage' and the term 'intoxicating liquor' shall include only those liquors, wines and beers
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termed 'blending.' ,,55 Since beer and wine are not distilled, but brewed
and fermented, they are not "liquors. '5 6
Moreover, the "Tied House Evil" law is designed to address types
of vendors, not types of beverages; and typically throughout the
Liquors and Beverage law, types of vendors are treated differently.
Finally, it should be noted that the definitional grounds involving
the term "intoxicating liquor" could not have been a basis for the
Castlewood I decision since the approach adopted by the court in
Castlewood II was not detailed in the pleadings of any of the parties
until a brief was filed by a new amicus curiae5 7 just prior to the
supreme court's decision in Castlewood II.
Rejecting the definitional rationale for the decision in Castlewood
II as ill founded, it might still be considered possible that a reasonable
hypothesis to sustain the two Castlewood decisions could be found in
the fourteenth amendment standards set forth in Castlewood I.
However, the equal protection argument is particularly weak in its
insistence that there be a rational relationship between the legislation and
the "purpose in issue."5 8 In Flemming v. Nestor" the United States
Supreme Court observes that by a particular mode of reasoning, the
legislation at issue might be found not to violate Due Process limitations,
and thus
it is, of course, constitutionally irrelevent whether this reason-
ing in fact underlay the legislative decision, as it is irrelevant
that the section does not extend to all to whom the postulated
rationale might in logic apply.
Moreover, considering the United States Supreme Court's apparent
appraisal of the constitutional attack in Mayhue as lacking in merit or as
already fully decided in other Supreme Court cases, 60 the Supreme Court
of Florida seems to have given too much weight to arguments based on
insubstantial questions of federal constitutionality, since the issues
presented in Castlewood I are identical to those in Mayhue.
The court's decisions are all the more susceptible to attack since the
apparent, though obscured, basis for the holdings in both Castlewood
decisions is to a great degree, substantive due process. It is clear that the
substantive due process standard may not legitimately be applied in any
case involving state legislative regulation of alcoholic beverage sales,
6 1
although it has occasionally been suggested. 62
55. FLA. STAT. § 565.01 (1973).
56. Beer is defined in FLA. STAT. § 563.01 (1973) and wine in FLA. STAT. § 564.01 (1973).
57. Representing Southern Wine & Spirits, Inc., American Distributors, Inc., Carbo, Inc.,
and West Florida Liquor Distributors, Inc.
58. 294 So. 2d at 324 (emphasis added).
59. 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960) (5th amendment case).
60. See note 19 supra.
61. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 39 (1966).
62. Parks v. Allen, 409 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1969). The point is made in reliance upon Louis
K. Liggett Co. v. Galdridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928), which has since been overruled in North
Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
CASE COMMENT
The unwarranted extension of this standard into the area of
alcoholic beverage regulation by the court in Castlewood is unfortunate
because it poses an implicit threat to future legislative action in this field.
Since the overwhelming presumption of constitutional validity given to
all state alcoholic beverage legislation by the twenty-first amendment
proves insufficient to deter the supreme court from a foray into that
special area of state regulation, the mantle of substantive due process,
however disguised, may provide sufficient means to enter into any other
field of economic legislation. At present, the lower courts in Florida seem
reluctant to intrude further into the legislative scheme, even in sub-
sequent proceedings between the same parties. 63 Legislative attempts to
deal with the Castlewood mandate have so far been fruitless. 64
Hopefully the Castlewood cases are an anomaly. A continued or
extended imposition of substantive due process standards by the Sup-
reme Court of Florida creates a significant obstacle to the fruition of
legislative intent. Moreover, such a policy might provide a fertile source
of encouragement for future litigation by parties asserting insubstantial
constitutional objections to any legislation.
63. See Castlewood Int'l Corp. v. Ashley, No. 73-412 (Leon Co. Cir. Ct., Mar. 20, 1975)
(denial of motion for contempt in suit by Castlewood against successor Director of Division of
Beverage and others; alleged contempt in de facto price increase for beer sold to plaintiff on
credit). The court refuses to insist that distributors sell beer at the same price to cash and credit
customers.
64. In the Florida legislature, section 562.21 was reintroduced on May 17, 1974, as House
Bill 4139, fully armed with Supreme Court cases and legislative history to avoid a repeat of
Castlewood. The bill, however, died on the House calendar.
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